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OBLIGATIONS
Alston Johnson*
SOLIDARITY: ONCE MORE WITH FEELING
Over the years, solidarity has occupied the greatest portion of
this subject in the symposium.' Once again this year, solidarity is in
the judicial news. Fortunately, both the general concept and the
specific cases dealing with it during this term are treated in an ex-
tended student comment in this issue.2 Accordingly, only a brief
mention of the decisions will be made in this forum; the reader is
urged to consult the student comment for a more detailed discus-
sion.
During this term, the supreme court first deferred' and then
resolved' the question of whether an employer is solidarily liable
with its employee to the victim of the employee's fault. Since Cox v.
Shreveport Packing Company5 was decided in 1948, the rule has
been that no solidary liability existed between the employer and the
employee. As a consequence, a suit by the victim against one did not
interrupt prescription as to the other.'
The first decision on the subject during this term was Thomas v.
W & W Clarklift, Inc.7 An employee brought suit against the cor-
poration (and its insurer) which had sold to his employer the item
that caused his work-related injury. More than a year after the inci-
dent, and more than six months after they had filed an answer, the
defendants filed a third party demand against certain executive of-
ficers of the employer. The court of appeal affirmed the sustaining
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term- Obliga-
tions, 36 LA. L. REV. 375 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1974-1975 Term]; The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 280,
291-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1973-1974 Term]; The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1972-1973 Term].
2. Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41
LA. L. REV. 659 (1981).
3. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
4. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
5. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
6. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097: "A suit brought against one of the debtors in
solido interrupts prescription with regard to all."
7. 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979) (Marcus, J., dissenting; Dennis, J., concurring in the
result).
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of exceptions based on prescription.8 The supreme court, however,
held that the potential liability of the selling corporation and of the
executive officers of the employer was solidary. Solidarity between
these parties would give to the seller a right of contribution against
the executive officers which would only arise upon payment by the
seller of the main demand. Thus the demand for contribution was
timely and should not have been dismissed. The court distinguished
Cox on the ground that it involved the relationship of an employer
and its employee, not executive officers of the employer and a third
person.'
But Cox was clearly moribund, and its execution was shortly to
follow. In Foster v. Hampton,10 the supreme court squarely held that
an employer and an employee were solidarily liable to the victim of
the employee's fault, and specifically overruled Cox. The issue was
presented in a difficult factual situation, in which such an outcome
could have been predicted. In an earlier decision in the same litiga-
tion, the supreme court held for the first time that the state rather
than a sheriff was the employer of a deputy sheriff." On remand, the
victim then named the state as an additional party defendant and
was met with the expected plea of prescription. Although the lower
courts had upheld the plea, 2 the supreme court refused to do so,
reasoning that the state as employer and the deputy sheriff as tort-
feasor were solidarily liable to the victim. Thus, the original suit as
to the deputy sheriff had interrupted prescription as to the state.
Having sent the victim back to sue the state, the court was then
hardly in a position to declare such a suit prescribed.
In its opinion, the supreme court noted doctrinal and jurispru-
dential 4 comments critical of the absence of solidarity between
employer and employee and critical of the "distinction" between im-
perfect and perfect solidarity when that distinction produced no dif-
ference in result. The only difference in result was supposed to be
8. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 365 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
9. This distinction escaped Justice Marcus, whose brief dissent noted: "If
employer's vicarious liability is not solidary with that of his employee, I am unable to
see how the vicarious liability of the employer is solidary with the concurrent
negligence of a third party .... 375 So. 2d at 379 (Marcus, J., dissenting). It also
escaped Justice Dennis, who urged that Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co. should be over-
ruled. 375 So. 2d at 379 (Dennis, J., concurring).
10. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980) (Summers, C.J., concurring in the result; Marcus and
Blanche, JJ., dissenting).
11. Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977).
12. Foster v. Hampton, 372 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
13. 1973-1974 Term, supra note 1, at 291-98.
14. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., concurring). See also
1972-1973 Term, supra note 1.
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that suit against a person merely imperfectly solidarily bound to
another would not interrupt prescription, while such a suit against
one of perfectly solidarily bound obligors would be an interruption.
For many years, this difference in result has not obtained in Lou-
isiana. A suit against one of the solidary obligors interrupted
prescription as to all, perfect or imperfect. In the absence of that
difference, there was little reason to support the distinction.'5
Noting that there was no legislative basis for the distinction in
any event, the supreme court found that the "distinction drawn be-
tween perfect and imperfect solidarity" was "untenable" and "must
be rejected."'6 While there may be academic interest in continuing
to delineate perfect and imperfect solidarity at inception," there is
now a candid recognition at the highest judicial level of what has
been the case for some time: No consequences arise from the distinc-
tion.
The overruling of Cox should produce the eventual overruling of
Wooten v. Wimberly,8 in which the court relied upon Cox. Wooten
held that a parent and child are not solidarily liable to the victim of
the child's fault.'9 Such a holding will now be inconsistent with the
15. [Als a practical matter, the law has not distinguished strangers who find
themselves solidarily liable from parties who choose to so bind themselves and
become mandataries for each other; and accordingly no distinction should be made
between them. The doctrine of imperfect solidarity might be retained as a distinc-
tion in the manner in which solidary obligations may be created but there is no
reason to decide that it should produce different effects thereafter.
1973-1974 Term, supra note 1, at 297-98.
16. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980).
17. It may be useful to continue to recognize that persons may be bound at dif-
ferent times, for different reasons, and in different ways for the same debt, and still be
solidarily liable. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2092. One person may be liable "in tort" and
the other "in contract." See Gremillion v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d
712 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 134 (La. 1974); 1974-1975 Term, supra
note 1. Or one person may be bound by one contractual agreement, and the other by a
different agreement. Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974); 1973-1974 Term, supra note 1. These are persons who do not act as man-
dataries of each other. Whatever name we give to their solidarity, we should recall
that they can be solidarily liable to the creditor even though they are not, for example,
business partners who sign a promissory note together and are thus "perfectly"
solidary obligors.
18. 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973).
19. Wooten presented a difficult factual situation. The tort victim had first sued
the parent and his liability insurer for the alleged negligence of the minor child. The
victim lost on the merits. Before that judgment was final, the victim filed another suit
against the insurer and the child himself, now relieved of the disabilities of minority. A
plea of prescription was sustained in the second suit, and that ruling was before the
court in Wooten. The victim argued that the suit against the parent had interrupted
prescription, because the parent and the child were solidarily liable. There was no
reason for the victim to have the opportunity to re-litigate the issue on the merits in
19811
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employer/employee relationship decreed by Foster, and there ap-
pears to be no basis for the inconsistency. In fact, solidarity be-
tween a vicariously liable" or financially responsible 1 party and the
alleged wrongdoer, as to the victim, should be the general rule for
all such relationships. This does not mean that contribution must
necessarily be the rule as between the obligors themselves. The
Civil Code provides for indemnity between them in some instances."2
The jurisprudence also permits indemnity in some cases.23 And the
comparative negligence provisions now in force will theoretically
permit a sharing on a basis which is neither equal contribution nor
indemnity.2
ILLEGAL CAUSE: AGREEMENTS NOT TO COMPETE
Enforcement of an agreement by an employee not to compete
with the employer after termination of their relationship has proved
to be a troublesome issue for Louisiana courts. They are not alone in
their quandary. Courts in many jurisdictions are currently grappling
with the problem of weighing the conflicting interests of employer
and employee in this context." Employers are seeking legitimate
the second suit, and the court could prevent that by sustaining the plea of prescrip-
tion. To do so, it ruled that there was no solidarity between parent and child, and
therefore no interruption of prescription. Even that ruling produced three dissents.
20. I.e., an employer who responds for an employee or a parent for a negligent
child. In this context, vicarious liability is the principle which requires a party innocent
of wrongdoing to respond for a wrongdoer because of the relationship between the
two.
21. I.e., in Louisiana, a parent who responds for damage caused by a child under
the age of discernment. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975). Since a child
under the age of discernment is not a "wrongdoer" in the ordinary sense of the word,
one cannot accurately term this "vicarious liability." It is more in the order of "finan-
cial responsibility," in which one innocent person responds for damage caused by
another innocent person, because of their relationship. See A. JOHNSON, R. LAMONICA &
C. JOSEPH, 2 LOUISIANA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL AND CIVIL, 246-86 (1980).
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2106.
23. See, e.g., Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922).
24. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431 (effective August 1, 1980).
25. These struggles are reflected in numerous doctrinal commentaries. See, e.g.,
Hughes, Employee Non-Competition Agreements: A Review of Massachusetts Law, 63
MASS. L. REV. 27 (1978); Kniffen, Employee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils of
Performing Unique Services, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 25 (1978); Comment, Enforcement of
Employee Noncompetition Agreements in Oregon, 58 ORE. L. REV. 336 (1979); Com-
ment, Contracts: Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 665 (1978).
Louisiana writers have also been active. 1974-1975 Term, supra note 1, at 393-97; Com-
ment, Agreements Not to Compete, 33 LA. L. REV. 94 (1972); Comment, Obliga-
tions-Agreements in Restraint of Competition, 11 LA. L. REV. 383 (1951); Note, Con-
tracts-Restrictive Covenants-Agreements Not to Compete, 27 TUL. L. REv. 364
(1953).
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ways of protecting their "investment" in employees with special
training and skills without running afoul of the traditional judicial
protection of the employee's freedom to follow his chosen
avocation."6
A few years ago, the writer had occasion in this forum' to com-
ment about Orkin Exterminating Company v. Foti," a decision in
which the Louisiana Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the
various circuits by severely limiting the applicability of non-
competition agreements. With appropriate professorial caution, the
writer observed that the conflict "apparently is settled, at least for
the moment . . . ."29 A more accurate statement would have been
that a portion of the conflict was settled. Recent cases have brought
to the fore a different, and more complex, aspect of the question.
Louisiana courts have usually understood an "agreement not to
compete" as being a provision which forbids the employee in ques-
tion from entering a competing business within a specified time
period in a designated geographical area. Indeed, this has been the
type of provision most employers want to enforce. The most direct
form of protection for the employer who may have trained the
employee, or advertised the employee's expertise in the particular
field, is to prohibit any competition by him at all in that field. But,
this is also the type of restriction that imposes the greatest burden
on the employee, taking from him the skill by which he can best
earn his living. It is not surprising that courts have traditionally
reacted against such a harsh remedy. Some states, including Lou-
isiana, have reacted legislatively to such provisions,0 while others rely
26. An excellent and thorough discussion of the important policy issues underly-
ing this clash of interests is contained in Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Com-
pete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960).
27. 1974-1975 Term, supra note 1, at 393-97.
28. 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974).
29. 1974-1975 Term, supra note 1, at 375-96.
30. It is reported that nine states have enacted statutes on the subject: Alabama,
California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South
Dakota. Kniffen, supra note 25, at 25 n.3. To these must be added Oregon, which
enacted a statute in 1977. ORE. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (1977). See Comment, Enforcement
of Employee Noncompetition Agreements In Oregon, 58 ORE. L. REV. 336 (1979). Its
statute applies only to employees, and thus not to vendors, for example. The statute
declares void non-competition agreements as defined, unless the agreement is entered
into upon the initial employment of the employee with the employer.
The statutes of California, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota
proscribe non-competition agreements except those ancillary either to sale of a
business or to dissolution of a partnership. CAL. [Bus. & PROF.] CODE §§ 16600-02 (Deer-
ing); MONT. CODES ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to 705 (1979); N. D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (West 1966); S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to
11 (1967). California also allows enforcement of a non-competition agreement ancillary
19811
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upon ordinary common law principles to reach similar results. 1
Non-competition agreements may have other features as well.
Often, the employee agrees not to solicit former customers or pre-
sent employees. Or he may be forbidden to use customer lists, price
lists, marketing strategies, or other "trade secrets" developed by
the employer.
Louisiana's legislative reaction to non-competition agreements
was a Depression-era statute invalidating any agreement by an em-
ployee "not to engage in any competing business" with the em-
ployer.32 In a time when the supply of labor greatly exceeded the de-
mand, it was not in the public interest for certain laborers to be ex-
cluded from those callings for which they might be best trained.
to the sale by a shareholder of all his shares in a corporation. CAL. [Bus. & PROF.] CODE
§ 16601 (Deering). South Dakota provides an additional exception to nonenforcement of
such a clause when the employee is in a profession and the agreement is for no more
than ten years within a radius of twenty-five miles of the previous employment. S. D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-11 (1967). The effect of the statutes in these states, then, is
to invalidate any non-competition agreement signed by an ordinary non-professional
employee. Thus, their statutory scheme approaches the result of those states using
precepts of the common law, which are less likely to restrict or annul a non-
competition clause when the employee is a professional who probably did not enter a
contract of adhesion.
However, the statutes in these states permit enforcement of non-competition
clauses in instances in which the Louisiana courts have denied enforcement. Arguably,
the Louisiana statute in using the word "employee" does not apply to shareholders,
partners, and perhaps even professionals. But the Louisiana courts have invalidated
non-competition agreements as to these persons as well, citing the "public policy"
behind the statute even though it might not literally apply. Marine Forwarding &
Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (shareholder, officer,
and director); Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So. 2d 361 (1942) (partner); Blanchard v.
Haber, 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928) (dentist) (decided prior to Act 133 of 1934);
Nelson v. Associated Branch Pilots, 63 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) (member of
pilots' association). But see Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson, 131 La. 204, 59 So. 122
(1912) (enforcement of non-competition agreement against partner prior to enactment
of Act 133 of 1934).
There are some Louisiana decisions enforcing non-competition agreements ancillary
to the sale of a business. Ballero v. Heslin, 128 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); J.
Alfred Mouton, Inc. v. Hebert, 199 So. 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940). But even these
clauses have been restricted in a more recent case. Hirsh v. Miller, 249 La. 489, 187
So. 2d 709 (1966).
The statutes in Alabama, Michigan and Florida-like the Louisiana statute-permit
enforcement of non-competition clauses so long as they are limited in time and geog-
raphy. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1977) (same county); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.761 &
766 (1967) (ninety days, if employer has provided customer list); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
542.12 (West 1972) ("reasonably" limited in time and geography). Decisions in these
states still reflect judicial dissatisfaction even with limited enforceability. United Loan
Corp. v. Weddle, 77 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1955).
31. See Blake, supra note 26, at 646-51.
32. 1934 La. Acts, No. 133 (now appearing as LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950 & Supp. 1962)).
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Some years thereafter, the prohibition was softened by the proviso
that an employer could enforce such an agreement, limited in time
and geography, if he could show he had incurred "an expense in the
training of the employee" or "an expense in the advertisement of
the business that the employer is engaged in .... 
Taken literally, the proviso could have undermined the basic
prohibition of the statute. An employer could easily enforce a non-
competition agreement for up to two years over the same geograph-
ical area as that in which the employee had worked simply by show-
ing that he incurred "an expense" in training or advertisement. The
statute placed no monetary or other requisite on that "expense."
The courts of appeal differed on the interpretation of the pro-
viso. One circuit required that a substantial expenditure be shown,"
while the others were more lenient on the point. 5 Finally, in Foti,
the supreme court held that substantial expenses were necessary in
order to support a non-competition agreement. Since that decision
and as of this writing, there is no reported appellate decision in
which a sufficient showing has been made to support a non-
competition clause."
33. The amended statute presently reads:
No employer shall require or direct any employee to enter into any contract
whereby the employee agrees not to engage in any competing business for
himself, or as the employee of another, upon the termination of his contract of
employment with such employer, and all such contracts, or provisions thereof con-
taining such agreement shall be null and unenforceable in any court, provided
that in those cases where the employer incurs an expense in the training of the
employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business that the
employer is engaged in, then in that event it shall be permissible for the
employer and employee to enter into a voluntary contract and agreement
whereby the employee is permitted to agree and bind himself that at the termina-
tion of his or her employment that said employee will not enter into the same
business that employer is engaged over the same route or in the same territory
for a period of two years.
LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950 & Supp. 1962).
34. See, e.g., National Motor Club of Louisiana, Inc. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So. 2d 110 (1965). Accord, Peltier v.
Hebert, 245 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
35. See, e.g., Aetna Fin. Co. v. Adams, 170 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 247 La. 489, 172 So. 2d 294 (1965). Accord, National School Studios, Inc. v. Bar-
rios, 236 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); World Wide Health Studios, Inc. v. Des-
mond, 222 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
36. See ADR v. Graves, 374 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (court refused to
uphold non-competition agreement because employer showed only normal training and
administrative expenses); Target Rental Towel, Inc. v. Byrd, 341 So. 2d 600 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1977) (court refused to uphold agreement when employer could show no train-
ing expenses at all and only $25.00 for business cards for the employee and $75.00 for
an advertisement linking the employee and the -business; court noted that during the
1981]
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But in recent decisions, including one during this term, ancillary
clauses prohibiting solicitation of customers or former fellow em-
ployees have also come under discussion. In Orkin Exterminating
Company, Inc. v. Broussard," the employer had both a non-
competition clause and a non-solicitation clause. It conceded that it
did not have the proof of expenditures sufficient to uphold the non-
competition clause. But it argued that it could uphold the non-
solicitation clause without proof of such expenditures, since the
statute did not specifically govern such clauses. The supreme court
held that there was no distinction "in legal principle" between the
two,8 and that even the non-solicitation clause could not be enforced
without a showing of the necessary expenses. The same conclusion
was reached last year in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Simpson,"
in which the court cited Broussard and added that the phrase in the
statute "any competing business" was broad enough to reach agree-
ments which would enjoin all components of a competing business
operation, such as solicitation of customers. The court held that in-
sufficient expenses were shown, and that since in its view of the
statute they had to be shown in order to support a non-solicitation
clause, the clause could not be enforced.
Finally, during this term in John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v.
Woods," the court upheld a non-solicitation clause (pirating of fellow
employees), concluding that R.S. 23:921 had no application. The
court's reasoning was that while an employee could engage in a com-
peting business, he could properly be enjoined from hiring away his
former co-employees for that business. Thus, it again appears that
the circuits are in conflict.
four years that the employee was employed, this amounted to only $25.00 per year);
Gulf Toy House, Inc. v. Bertrand, 306 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (court refused
to uphold agreement even though considerable expenses were shown; expenses were
characterized as for normal yearly supervision and administration, not special expenses
with reference to three employees in question); Glazer Steel Corp. v. Espenan, 306 So.
2d 78 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (court in circuit previously lenient in enforcing non-
competition clauses refused to uphold one, noting that no extraordinary expenses had
been demonstrated). See also Fine v. Property Damage Appraisers, Inc., 393 F. Supp.
1304 (E.D. La. 1975) (applying Louisiana law; the court refused to uphold agreement
when employer could show only advertising in the form of two single sheets containing
employee's picture and resum6 sent to insurance companies announcing opening of of-
fice, and only training in showing employee how to keep proper records as the
employer wanted them kept).
37. 346 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 1276.
39. 370 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979). See
also ADR v. Graves, 374 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), in which the court refused
to uphold an ordinary non-competition agreement and rejected a claim upon solicitation
of customers while the employee was still in the service of the employer.
40. 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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Two reactions are possible at the supreme court level. The court
could hold that that statute extends to all forms of non-competition
agreements, including agreements not to solicit customers and em-
ployees, not to use customer lists, and not to use other trade
secrets. In that event, such agreements would be virtually impossi-
ble to enforce, since proof of the necessary "expense" to justify
them would be so difficult. On the other hand, the court could hold
that the statute invalidates only agreements not to engage in a com-
peting business and does not apply to agreements such as non-
solicitation clauses. Such a ruling would permit an employee to en-
gage in a competing business, but not to violate other restrictive
clauses to which he might have agreed during his employment. If
the court chooses the latter ruling, it should assure itself that the
other restrictions are narrowly drawn, imposing only such limits on
the employee's conduct in a new business as are reasonably nec-
essary to protect an employer's interests.
The same policy reasons which militate against preventing an
employee from entering a competing business at all are not present
when other restrictive clauses are at issue. The court should con-
sider distinguishing between treatment of general non-competition
clauses and the validity of non-solicitation clauses, for example.' The
interest of the employee (and coincidentally the interest of society
as a whole) in engaging in work for which he is trained is so sub-
stantial that it is unlikely that the employer's interest in protecting
his "investment" with a blanket non-competition clause will ever
outweigh it.'" Moreover, a total ban on competition (even if limited
in time and geography) is in many instances more protection than
the employer needs.
Permitting the employee to engage in competition, however,
does not require society to sanction unfair methods of competition.
If the employee sets about to lure away former fellow employees, or
to solicit former customers by using customer lists, special informa-
41. There is some indication of the willingness of some members of the supreme
court to make this distinction; it is found in the three dissents to denial of the writ re-
quested by the employer in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Simpson, 370 So. 2d 670
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979) (Calogero, Marcus and Blanche,
JJ., dissenting). The appellate court had held that the statute and its proof of expense
requirement applied to a non-solicitation clause as well as a non-competition clause.
Dicta in another recent decision also supports the distinction. National Oil Service of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Brown, 381 So. 2d 1269, 1273 n.2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (agreement
not to solicit customers and similar clauses not subject to R.S. 23:921, but no such
agreement found in case at hand).
42. This is no doubt the underlying reason why the Louisiana courts have been so
resistant to enforcing non-competition clauses, even those limited to fit the proviso in
LA. R.S. 23:921.
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tion about them or trade secrets he has gained while working for
the old employer, the policy reasons in favor of his conduct are
decidedly less compelling.
Even after the passage of Act 133 of 1934, and before passage of
the proviso approving limited non-competition agreements under
certain conditions, Louisiana courts had upheld or indicated ap-
proval of clauses prohibiting solicitation of employees or
customers," use of customer lists," or use of trade secrets.'5 The
passage of the proviso did not terminate such rulings."6 Often, the
court held that R.S. 23:921 applied only to agreements not to com-
pete, not agreements not to solicit customers or employees. 7 Only
recently has the statute been applied to both.'
If the court should rule that the statute does not apply to non-
solicitation clauses and similar agreements short of agreements not
to compete, it should still exercise caution that the restriction is
limited to what is appropriate with reference to the particular em-
ployee. It should consider the time period of the restriction; 9 the
43. Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Service, 221 La. 677, 60 So.
2d 83 (1952) (agreement not to lure away fellow employees upheld).
44. Baton Rouge Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Bloomenstiel, 88 So. 2d 742 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1956) (court indicated it might have upheld a prohibition against use of
customer lists, but held such use was not established).
45. See generally Comment, Agreements Not to Compete, 33 LA. L. REV. 94
(1972).
46. See Bookkeepers Business Service, Inc. v. Davis, 208 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1968) (agreement not to solicit customers upheld); Delta Fin. Co. v. Graves, 180 So.
2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) (agreement not to solicit customers upheld). See also
Buckeye Garment Rental Co. v. Jones, 276 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1967) (applying
Louisiana law; court severed prohibition against use of customers list from remainder
of contract and enforced it); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D.
La. 1967) (applying Louisiana law; court recognized the prohibition against revelation
of trade secrets could be enforced, but refused to grant an injunction absent proof that
such revelation was imminent or inevitable). Cf. Gulf Toy House, Inc. v. Bertrand, 306
So. 2d 361 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (court would not enjoin use of customer list from
memory; other cases distinguished on ground that employer's contract did not contain
specific prohibition against solicitation of customers from list).
47. Bookkeepers Business Service, Inc. v. Davis, 208 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1968); Delta Fin. Co. v. Graves, 180 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
48. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Broussard, 346 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Simpson, 370 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979) (Calogero, Marcus and Blanche, JJ., dissenting).
49. Professor Blake suggests in his article that the primary factor in this context
is the determination of how much time is needed for the risk of injury to be reasonably
reduced. If the principal purpose of a non-solicitation clause is to protect
customer/employer relationships, the duration of the restraining period is reasonable
only if it is no longer than necessary for the employer to put a new person on the job
and to permit that person to demonstrate to customers that he is an adequate replace-
ment for the former employee. If that demonstration is relatively simple, perhaps only
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geographical or "activity" limitation;0 the nature of the employee's
relationships with customers;" the importance of confidential busi-
ness information, if any; 2 personal circumstances of the employee,
including the uniqueness of his talent;53 and any other factors reflect-
a few months would be reasonable. If development of such a relationship can be shown
to be more complex and gradual, then a restraint of longer duration might be
reasonable. If protection of a trade secret is the purpose of the restraint, it is con-
ceivable that the duration could extend for the length of time in which the secret re-
tains considerable economic value to the former employer. See Blake, supra note 26, at
677-78.
50. Restraints which are solely geographic in nature, without reference to "activity"
within that area, appear to be losing popularity (if they ever had any) with the courts.
Blake, supra note 26, at 681. If the employee was one who dealt with customers
primarily at the employer's place of business, his link with the customers is likely to
be tenuous at best. A restraint prohibiting any solicitation of customers, present or
potential, within the entire geographical area in which the business operates is prob-
ably too broad to be reasonable. On the other hand, if the employee traveled exten-
sively to serve customers within a region, loyalty to that employee might be substan-
tial, and there is a greater risk of loss to the employer by solicitation. But a restraint
that purported to reach potential customers as well as those actually serviced by the
employee might still be too broad. Id. at 679-81.
51. This is perhaps the most important factor. If the business is fairly large and is
one in which the product or service being sold varies little from company to company,
the customer's primary contact with the business and the source of his trust in the
business may be the employee who services his account. To the extent that the
employer has fostered this relationship, or that his service or product in some way
enhances this effect, upholding a restraint might be proper. A court should inquire into
the frequency of the employee's contact with the customers, the locale of that contact,
and the nature of the services performed. Professor Blake terms this the "customer
contact" basis for examining a restraint. Id. at 653-67. It is not surprising that many of
the litigated cases in Louisiana involve businesses in which the services provided are
virtually interchangeable with those offered by other businesses, (often served by an
employee traveling a "route"), or are businesses in which frequent customer contact
with a particular employee plays a prominent part in the financial success of the
business. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974) (pest control;
employee followed designated route); Hirsh v. Miller, 249 La. 489, 187 So. 2d 709 (1966)
(same); John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979)
(beauty salons; frequent customer contact and substantial relationship with individual
employee likely); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Broussard, 346 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1977) (pest control); National School Studios, Inc. v. Barrios, 236 So. 2d 309 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1970) (photographing school children); World Wide Health Studios, Inc. v.
Desmond, 222 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (weight reduction and exercise; fre-
quent contact with individual employees).
52. It would be appropriate for the court to inquire into whether the information
is genuinely unique or substantially different from that used by others in the trade. It
might also examine whether the employer voluntarily provided it to the employee
when .he was not under an obligation of secrecy. See Blake, supra note 26, at 667-74.
53. The interest of society as a whole becomes a factor here. If the employee is
highly trained and specialized when he joins the employer, and receives little addi-
tional expertise from the employer and makes little contribution to the business,
upholding of a restraint should be unusual. The loss to such an individual and to soci-
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ing upon the reasonableness of the restraint placed upon the em-
ployee when measured against the interest of the employer sought
to be protected."
Legislative clarification of whether R.S. 23:921 should apply to
clauses other than general non-competition clauses would be helpful.
In the interim, employers should carefully review restrictive clauses
in employment contracts. They should decide what specific interest
they seek to protect by the restriction, and whether the restriction
is only as broad as it need be to achieve that protection. Restric-
tions appropriate for some employees, or in some portions of the
business, may not be appropriate for others.
If it is determined that some restrictive clauses are necessary,
then the employer should segregate those expenses incurred for the
training of each individual subject to the restrictions and for the
advertisement that this individual is the person to whom the public
should turn for services. Careful records of such expenses should be
kept. Certainly this should be the case if a general non-competition
clause within the statutory proviso is included in the employment
contract. And if the supreme court should hold that other restrictive
clauses are subject to the same proof of expenses, the records will
be vital.
The recent decisions indicate at the very least that Louisiana
courts will not accept the various types of restrictive clauses with-
out close scrutiny. Employers should engage in their own self-
scrutiny first, so as not to be found wanting when judicial examina-
tion of an employment contract occurs.
AUTHENTIC ACT: PRE-MARITAL AGREEMENT
Prior to the recent amendments of matrimonial regime law, 5 ar-
ticle 2328 of the Civil Code required that "every matrimonial agree-
ety is great when he is restrained from employing these special abilities. Id. at 684-86.
In some jurisdictions, this analysis takes the form of a discussion of the unique nature
of the employee's talent. It has been suggested that the employee with unique talents
should not be restrained from contributing those to society under the aegis of another
employer. Kniffin, supra note 25.
54, A court might be more willing to uphold a restraint if it believed it possessed
the power to sever the unacceptable portions of it and "whittle down" the restriction
to the point at which it is reasonable. See Eastern Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666,
567 P.2d 1371 (1977); Comment, Contracts: Employee Covenants Not To Compete, 17
WASHBURN L.J. 665 (1978). The Louisiana courts have not exhibited any proclivity
toward engaging in such handicraft.
55. Act 627 of 1978 repealed Civil Code article 2328 and replaced it with R.S.
9:2834, which required that any contract establishing a matrimonial regime or modify-
ing it be made "only by an act passed before a notary public and two witnesses." This
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ment must be made by an act before a notary and two witnesses."
In Rittiner v. Sinclair,"6 the meaning of that requirement was a col-
lateral issue. The husband brought suit against his wife for divorce,
and also for recognition of the validity of a pre-marital agreement
providing for separate property. There was a slight discrepancy at
trial between the husband's version and the wife's version of the se-
quence of events surrounding confection of the agreement. But,
there was little doubt that on the day of confection of the instru-
ment, the wife-to-be appeared before a notary and two witnesses
and signed the agreement. 7 The husband-to-be appeared on the
same day before the same notary and the same witnesses and signed
the agreement, but not at the same time that his prospective spouse
signed the agreement.58 The notary and witnesses also signed the
agreement, but the record does not reflect the precise time that
they did so.
On original hearing, the court of appeal invalidated the agree-
ment on the ground that the Civil Code required that the parties to
the contract appear and sign simultaneously before the notary and
witnesses. On rehearing, the court reversed itself on that point, and
held that there had been no showing that the marriage contract in
question was not an authentic act. The case was remanded for reso-
lution of the claim by the husband that no community existed be-
tween the spouses.
The result is correct under the peculiar facts presented. The act
in question was not irregular on its face, and no claim of forgery
was made. A strict interpretation of the Civil Code would require
exclusion of extrinsic evidence. 9 The act recited that the parties
provision, before it became effective, was repealed by Act 709 of 1979. It was replaced
by a new article (effective January 1, 1980), Civil Code article 2331, which provides
that a matrimonial agreement "shall be made by authentic act or by an act under
private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses."
56. 374 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
57. Appellate Record at 14-15.
58. Id. at 103-04.
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2236: "The authentic act is full proof of the agreement con-
tained in it, against the contracting parties and their heirs or assigns, unless it be
declared and proved a forgery."
LA. CiV. CODE art. 2276: "Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or
beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been said before, or at the
time of making them, or since."
See Succession of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852) (evidence that party may not have
signed before witnesses, as document stated, should not be admitted unless forgery
alleged; on rehearing, judgment of supreme court set aside without reasons and new
trial granted). See generally Writing Requirements and the Parol Evidence Rule, 35
LA. L. REV. 745, 775-78 (1975).
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"personally came and appeared" before the notary and "in the pre-
sence of the witnesses hereinafter undersigned." It also recited that
the act was "passed . . . in the presence of" the two competent
witnesses, "who hereunto sign their names with the said appearers
and me, Notary, after reading of the whole."6 The act does not
recite that the parties appeared simultaneously, but the remainder
of the act permits the implication that they did.6' The simplest and
most direct way for the appellate court to uphold the validity of the
agreement was to refuse to consider extrinsic evidence to contradict
it, in the absence of an allegation of forgery.
But, even with consideration of the evidence tending to show
that the parties appeared separately before the same notary and the
same witnesses, the result can still be approved. One of the primary
functions of the requirement that certain types of agreements be in
authentic form is a cautionary one. The occasion has been called "an
invitation to reflect on what one is doing." 2 Execution of the agree-
ment before a notary and witnesses adds an air of solemnity and for-
mality which may induce final reflection of whether the act is wise
or not. Ideally, the notary should also undertake to assure himself or
herself that the party who is about to sign the document under-
stands what the document has, and what basic legal consequences it
entails. If satisfied that the person before him is the person de-
scribed in the instrument, and understands its consequences, the
notary can proceed to execute the instrument.
This function of the notary was, and is, better understood and
more rigorously carried out in France and other civil law countries
60. Appellate Record, attachment to plaintiffs original petition; plaintiffs Exhibit
No. 1 under the proffer, Appellate Record at 19. The trial judge required that the
testimonial evidence be admitted only within a proffer, but not because of its nature as
attacking the authentic act. Both the act and the testimony were admitted within a
proffer because the trial judge was of the opinion that the issue of partition of the
property was not before the court.
61. The implication is weak, but nonetheless available. The parties were said to
have appeared and "severally" declared their intentions. If they appeared separately,
there would be no need to state that they "severally" declared their intentions. The
act declared that the witnesses signed their names "with the said appearers and me,
Notary .... " Since the witnesses apparently signed only once, this is a declaration
that both parties were present when they did so. And finally, the act refers to a
"reading of the whole" in the singular, and not to multiple readings at two different
times in the day.
It may cogently be argued on the other side that the act does not specifically state
that the parties appeared simultaneously, and that therefore any evidence on the
simultaneity of their appearance is not contrary to the "full proof' contained in the act.
62. S. LITVINOFF & W. TETE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF
JURIDICAL ACTS 128 (1969).
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than in Louisiana. 3 But the fact that the cautionary and advisory
function of the notary is sometimes ignored should in no way de-
tract from its importance. Our courts should be careful to assure
that interpretation of the articles concerning authentic acts not only
leaves room for this function, but encourages it.
A procedure which does not respect this function should not be
approved. Thus, if one prospective spouse arrives at the notary's of-
fice with the agreement in hand, already signed by the other pro-
spective spouse, the completion of the document at that stage would
not achieve an authentic act. The signature of the absent spouse
might have been obtained by duress, or may be a forgery. But even
if it is a valid, voluntary signature, there has been no occasion for
the exercise of the cautionary function of the authentic act.
In the case at hand, there was no evidence as to when the
notary and witnesses signed. They apparently signed only once,
most probably at the time that one spouse or the other also signed.
One can probably conclude, then, that they did not sign at the time
the other spouse signed. But, the uncontradicted testimony at trial
by each spouse was that he or she came to the notary's office and
signed the document. The document recited that the spouses "ap-
peared" before the notary and the two witnesses, and there was no
contrary proof. From these facts, it must be concluded that the
possibility of the cautionary function was available. The notary
could have, and should have, informed each spouse upon appearance
of the nature of the act and its consequences. The presence of the
witnesses on each occasion added the desired formality to the reflec-
tion of the spouse. The court was correct in concluding that the arti-
cle does not require simultaneous appearance by the two spouses.
And in this unusual instance, their simultaneous appearance would
have added little to the cautionary function."
However, the court's opinion should not be interpreted too
broadly. The court observes that "[n]owhere does the law expressly
require that the notary and the witnesses sign the act in the
presence of the parties, and we now conclude that we erred in im-
posing such a requirement." 5 For the cautionary purpose of the act,
63. Writing Requirements and the Parol Evidence Rule, 35 LA. L. REV. 745,
773-75 (1975).
64. Perhaps the simultaneous presence of the parties would have assured that the
notary would have made only a single explanation of the consequences of the act. This
in turn would have assured that his comments did not favor one party or the other,
and left the contracting parties in exactly the same posture as to the decision each had
to make. As a practical matter, if the notary said anything at all to either of the par-
ties, it probably was very similar in nature.
65. Rittiner v. Sinclair, 374 So. 2d 680, 685 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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it is the witnesses' presence, not their signature, which is important.
For the evidentiary purpose of the act, it is their signature, as well
as their presence, which is important."6 The opinion could be taken
to mean that the witnesses could sign at some later hour or date,
and that practice could easily deteriorate into one in which the
witnesses are not actually present at the moment of execution by
the parties and notary.
This is not a desirable result. The French text of Article 2328
states that the act should be "passe par devant un notaire et deux
tdmoins"7 which is best translated as "executed in front of a notary
and two witnesses." The advisable method is that at the moment of
execution, all signing parties, the witnesses and the notary should
be present and should each sign in turn: parties, 8 then witnesses,69
then notary. 0 In the present instance, it would have been better for
66. They should be present so that they can faithfully assert that they have seen
the parties sign the agreement. They should sign so that they can be identified, and
their assertion then becomes final and binding, lending credibility and security to the
authentic act.
67. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 2328 (J. DAINOW
ed.) (article 2308 of the Civil Code of 1825). A literal translation of the French text
would not include the specific requirement that the parties, the witnesses, and the
notary appear and sign simultaneously. However, there appears to be an implication
that they will do so. Civil Code articles 1536 and 2328, as they appeared in the French
text of 1825, contain the word passd (executed) before a notary and two witnesses;
Civil Code article 2234 contains the word requ (received) by a notary and two
witnesses. If the witnesses and notary might just as well sign at another time, one
could not say that the complete authentic act was "executed" or "received." One would
have to say that it was partially "executed" or "received," to be completed at a later
time.
When one party could execute the act at a later time, the redactors explicitly so
provided. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1540. The fact that the redactors specifically provided in
Civil Code article 1578 that the public nuncupative testament requires execution in the
simultaneous presence of all the required persons may be explained by the provision
that there must be a public dictation and reading of the whole testament.
68. The parties should sign first because this is evidence of their agreement. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1762. If they do not sign, there is nothing to which the witnesses and
notary may attest.
69. The witnesses should next sign, having observed the signing by the parties.
They thus assert that individuals claiming to be those named in the instrument signed
in the witnesses' presence. The signatures of the witnesses affirm that the formalities
recited in the act have been observed.
70. Finally, the notary signs in his capacity as a neutral public officer charged
with receiving and certifying instruments of this type. His signature makes the instru-
ment an authentic act, entitled to the protections outlined in the Civil Code. His
signature affirms that the required course of action by parties and witnesses has been
followed. It should also affirm that he has discharged the cautionary function which is
traditionally required of him, and is implicit in the importance given to the authentic
act in the Civil Code of Louisiana.
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the prospective spouses to appear together before the notary and
the witnesses. Fortunately, the court's careful thought produced the
correct result on the facts presented. Unfortunately, lawyers and
notaries might be encouraged to be more careless after reading the
opinion. They should not. They should understand the cautionary as
well as the evidentiary function of the authentic act, and discharge
their responsibilties accordingly.
